Capital versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts

By Hans B. Christensen, Valeri V. Nikolaev. 2012

339 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/984814eb6e7c8bd2db914fbbd9e9d55ee9dd9299

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Citations in the corpus

Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, methodology): “Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) argue that capital covenants and performance covenants encountered in private debt contracts play conceptually different roles (see also Dyreng, Vashishtha, and Weber, 2014, and Hollander and Verriest, 2015).”
Political connections and the cost of bank loans (2014, neutral): “10 broader literature on financial contracting (e.g. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004; Asquith et al., 2005; Ball et al., 2008; Beatty et al., 2008; Guay, 2008; Graham et al.,, 2008; Armstrong and Guay, 2010; Costello and Wittenberg-moerman, 2011; Lin et al., 2011a,b; Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou, 2011;”
Measuring the Probability of Financial Covenant Violation in Private Debt Contracts (2016, neutral): “As another example, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) develop a theory that relates to the restrictions put on borrowers through performance versus capital covenants but measure intensity of covenant use through covenant counts rather than through violation probability.”
A measurement approach to conservatism and earnings management (2013, methodology): “, Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), and Tan (2012). (6)The idea of treating accounting rule as a mapping from transaction characteristics to accounting measures has a long history in accounting thoughts (see, e.g., Ijiri (1975), Leuz (1998b), and Leuz (1998a)).”
Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers (2014, neutral): “On average, debt contracts contain around three financial covenants (Ball et al., 2008a; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012).”
Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in Inter-Firm Relationships: Evidence from Long-Term Supply Contracts (2013, background): “Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) find that covenants based on profitability are timelier in detecting deteriorations in performance than other covenants, making them suited to provide an early option to renegotiate.”