Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions

By Alan D. Morrison. 2005

276 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0ada5370282cfc665d0e33b4b518728ad7de8417

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Citations in the corpus

Securitization and Bank Performance (2013, background): “Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Duffee and Zhou (2001), Morrison (2005), and Parlour and Plantin (2008) posit a negative link.”
Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion (2006, background): “Morrison (2005) shows that a market for credit derivatives can destroy the signalling role of bank debt and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result.”
Housing Price Booms and Crowding-Out Effects in Bank Lending (2018, background): “7Several papers analyze this theoretically, such as Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Morrison (2005), and Parlour and Plantin (2008).”
Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: How Banks Became Less Risky Individually But Posed Greater Risks to the Financial System at the Same Time (2011, unknown): “This may be through various methods, such as by increasing their lending (Instefjord (2005); Wagner (2007)), by reducing their monitoring and screening efforts ( Morrison (2005) ) or by leveraging up their capital structure (Jiangli et al. (2008)).”
Why Do (or Did?) Banks Securitize Their Loans? Evidence from Italy (2010, background): “Just to align the interests of securitizing banks and investors, instruments such as pooling, tranching and retention of tranches have been devised (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Kiff, Michaud and Mitchell, 2002; Morrison, 2005; Sufi, 2006; Pagano and V”
Financial Innovation and Bank Behavior: Evidence from Credit Markets (2014, background): “This may reduce banks’ incentives to screen and monitor borrowers (e.g., Morrison (2005)).”
Systemic Risk and Regulation (2005, unknown): “Morrison (2003) shows that a market for credit derivatives can destroy the signalling role of bank debt and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result.”
Credit Default Swaps: A Survey (2014, background): “Narayanan and Uzmanoglu [2012] use data on 84 distressed exchanges (25 CDS and 59 non-CDS) from 2004 to 2011 to conclude that CDS trading does not play a significant role in restructuring outcomes.”
Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem (2011, unknown): “Morrison (2005) argues that since CDS can undermine bank monitoring, borrowers may ine¢ ciently switch to bond nance, thus reducing welfare.”
Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (2010, unknown): “…to the literature that debates the costs and benefits of securitization (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2009; Keys et al., 2010, 2009; Rajan et al., 2008; Loutskina, 2006; Loutskina and Strahan, 2007; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Morrison, 2005; and Parlour and Plantin, 2008).”
Securitization is Not that Evil after All (2011, unknown): “Since this information cannot be credibly transmitted to the market when loans are securitized, banks might lack incentives to screen borrowers at origination or to keep monitoring them once the lending has been securitized (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2007).”
Has the CDS Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt (2009, background): “Morrison (2005) makes this point precisely with respect to CDS. 11See Drucker and Puri (2007) for evidence on how banks and firms adjust the loan contract design in order to reduce the agency problems arising from the sale of the loan.”
Credit default swaps and corporate innovation (2019, background): “Recent studies (e.g., Morrison, 2005) show that the onset of CDS trading weakens lenders’ incentives to engage in costly monitoring and to intervene in borrowers’ governance because lenders’ claims can be insured via CDSs. Shan, Tang, and Winton (2015) find that covenants on a borrower’s debt…”