Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and Evidence

By Sanjai Bhagat, Ming Dong, David A. Hirshleifer, R. Noah. 2005

311 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a1ccf394d75829b9ecb40b5394c77fc819a38f9f

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Citations in the corpus

How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Synergies (2009, unknown): “This estimate is similar to those obtained by other merger studies such as Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) and Bhagat et al. (2005). The detailed data in the Value Line forecasts allow us to decompose the value gain in mergers into the underlying components.”
CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions (2007, background): “Maquiera et al. (1998) and Bhagat et al. (2004) provide further empirical evidence that acquiring firm stockholders gain less from diversifying acquisitions than from non-diversifying acquisitions.”
A Market-Based Study of the Cost of Default (2012, background): “For example, Bhagat et al.(2005) and Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) account for investors’ expectations and learning in the context of mergers and acquisitions.”
A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand? (2008, background): “…448 1519 729 All deals +0.64* +1.20* +0.69* Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), US 1985-90 1990-95 MAM (-1, +1) 1214 2832 Domestic deals +0.44a +1.49c Bhagat et al. (2005), US 1962-68 1968-80 1981-84 1985-88 1989-92 1993-96 1997-00 2000-01 MM The results differ when new PSM is applied (-5, +5) 71…”
Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter? (2007, background): “The disadvantages come from the noise in the stock price reaction stemming from the degree of anticipation of the deal, uncertainty over the final price and resolution of the deal, information about the standalone value of the bidder, and information asymmetry between managers and outside investors ”
Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers (2009, background): “Also, see Bhagat et al (2005) who analyze the spillover effect of a competing bid to acquire a target on a bidder’s stand-alone valuation of the target.”
Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers (2009, background): “16 Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), and Bhagat et al. (2005) report positive combined bidder-target announcement returns, which suggests that mergers on average create positive synergies.”
Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market (2003, unknown): “(2002), Bhagat et al. (2005)), our finding is compatible with some other available evidence.”
CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to Deal Completion (2016, unknown): “Investor perceptions not only reflect reactions to the bid premium, but also include anticipations of the likelihood of deal completion (Bhagat et al. (2005)).”
Rumor Has It: Sensationalism in Financial Media (2015, background): “In the spirit of Bhagat et al. (2005), if we ignore the time lag between the rumor and a public merger announcement, the day zero return has two components: the likelihood that the rumor will come true and the expected return of the target if the rumor does come true.”
Emerging Country Cross-Border Acquisitions: Characteristics, Acquirer Returns and Cross-Sectional Determinants (2011, unknown): “We document a significant positive relation between acquirer return and relative size of the acquisition in all regression specifications; this result is consistent with the findings in Moeller et al (2004) and Bhagat et al (2005).”
The danger of misinterpreting short-window event study findings in strategic management research: an empirical illustration using horizontal acquisitions (2008, background): “…upon announcement because horizontal acquisitions are subject to a higher level of antitrust scrutiny than other types of acquisitions, and therefore any positive reaction may be delayed until it becomes more certain that regulators will allow the acquisition to occur (see Bhagat et al., 2005).”