Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers

By A. Gande, Craig M. Lewis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2009

351 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/29ffeda634c7811792f764703e80f3f6ec49f19c

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In Accounting

1. Zhihong Chen
2. Anup Agrawal
3. H. Zou
4. James Malm
5. Binay Adhikari
6. Omrane Guedhami
7. Rongli Yuan
8. Wen Wen

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Zhihong Chen
2. Anup Agrawal
3. H. Zou
4. James Malm
5. Binay Adhikari
6. Rongli Yuan
7. Wen Wen

Citations in the corpus

• Shareholder Litigation, Reputational Loss, and Bank Loan Contracting (2014, neutral): “This model, presented in Table 7, is drawn from Gande and Lewis (2009) and our results are generally con-”
• The Effects of Securities Class Action Litigation on Corporate Liquidity and Investment Policy (2015, neutral): “Gande and Lewis (2009) find strong evidence of spillover effects in litigation.”
• Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct Research (2017, neutral): “4 Examples of careful empirical studies that use supplemental hand-collected data include Gleason et al. (2008), McNichols and Stubben (2008), Bowen, Call, and Rajgopal (2010), and Badertscher et al.”
• “See You in Court”: How CEO narcissism increases firms' vulnerability to lawsuits (2017, neutral): “Research has documented that lawsuits can damage a firm's value (e.g., Gande & Lewis, 2009; Koku, Qureshi, & Akhigbe, 2001) as well as its reputation (Haslem, Smith, & Hutton, 2015).”
• Corporate Fraud and the Value of Reputations in the Product Market (2014, neutral): “18 By using control firms in the same industry as the fraud firms, we are able to eliminate the impact of industry spillover (Gande and Lewis, 2009) and focus on the impact of the fraud itself on the relationship.”
• Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management (2012, neutral): “6 See Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004), Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b), Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008), Gande and Lewis (2009), and Karpoff and Lou (2010).”
• The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books (2008, neutral): “, Gande and Lewis (2009)).”
• Bankruptcy spillover effects on strategic alliance partners (2012, neutral): “To examine the viability of this alternative explanation, we follow the approach of Gande and Lewis (2009) and include a measure of the likelihood of bankruptcy of the bankrupt partner, computed in the year prior to the bankruptcy announcement, as an additional explanatory”
• Do women managers keep firms out of trouble? Evidence from corporate litigation and policies (2019, methodology): “, 2005; Gu, 2016). Firms that compete in areas with more homogeneous products are forced to invest more in R&D for differentiation. So, we control for product similarity and product market concentration using the text-based measure of Hoberg and Phillips (2016). On the other hand, agency theory pred”
• Directors׳ and officers׳ liability insurance and the cost of equity☆ (2016, background): “Gande and Lewis (2009) find that US firms with negative earnings surprises are more likely to be sued in class action suits.”
• Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Legal Changes (2019, neutral): “Shareholder litigation shapes corporate policies and affects shareholder wealth in various ways (Romano 1991; Gande and Lewis 2009). Lin, Officer, Wang, and Zou (2013) find that firms with greater litigation protection face higher financing costs.”