The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique

107 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Seeing mind in action (2012, background): “18 Pierre Jacob objects that DP, in denying that mental states are unobservable, equates mentality with behavior and thus collapses into a kind of crude behaviorism (Jacob 2011).”
What Is It like to Feel Another’s Pain?* (2012, background): “, Rizzolatti and Craighero 2005; Freedberg and Gallese 2007) or the direct perception view (e.g., Zahavi 2008). Now, as many philosophers have emphasized (e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Goldman 2006b), there are at least two broad kinds of imaginative processes: one can imagine that p and one ca”
Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds (2012, background): “…to which mindreading results from inferential processes based on the observation of behavior to the postulation of unobservable psychological states (Jacob 2011: 531).8 But in arguing that expressive behavior constitutes mental events and process, DP proponents seem to advocate a reduction of…”
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy (2017, background): “It has been argued that such a claim is hugely controversial in that it commits one to some form of behaviorism (Jacob 2011, p. 531).”