Private toll roads: Competition under various ownership regimes

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Winning or losing from dynamic bottleneck congestion pricing?: The distributional effects of road pricing with heterogeneity in values of time and schedule delay (2011, background): “Braid (1996) and de Palma and Lindsey (2000) demonstrate how with two bottlenecks in parallel, it remains optimal to eliminate all queuing at the priced bottleneck (we will refer to this priced alternative as the pay-lane).”
Strategic Investment and Pricing Decisions in a Congested Transport Corridor (2007, unknown): “De Palma and Lindsey (2000) use a bottleneck model of congestion and compare three types of ownership structure: a private road competing with a free access road, two competing private roads, and competition between a private and a public operator.”
Congestion Tolling in the Bottleneck Model with Heterogeneous Values of Time (2011, methodology): “De Palma and Lindsey (2000) note that a PPL operator has the incentive to eliminate queuing on its pay-lane because any decrease in queuing costs can be met by an increase in toll.”
The multi-class, multi-criteria traffic network equilibrium and systems optimum problem (2004, background): “This problem has been investigated in both static and dynamic situations by, for example, Braid (1996), Verhoef et al. (1996), Liu and McDonald (1999), and De Palma and Lindsey (2000) .”