We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind

By Daniel J. Povinelli, Jennifer Vonk. 2004

266 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Developmental Biology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a01727f3ef55b94a6542cd8c83c350a02ccee443

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In Developmental and Educational Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind (2014, background): “Second, and perhaps most important, mentalizing is so automatic for us as adults that it can be very difficult to understand how else infants could pass a ToM task (Povinelli & Vonk, 2004).”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “Moreover, recall that every determinate rule or set of rules that has been proposed so far has been controlled for in later experiments (and therefore refuted as a general account of the data), and that Povinelli and Vonk’s (2004) recipe for generating an indeterminate set of rules fails to issue in”
What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition (2008, background): “For example, Schubotz and von Cramon (2004) found activations in the ventral premotor cortex when subjects saw static arrays of geometrical objects and were asked whether the arrays followed some regular order or not.”
Rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta, know what others can and cannot hear (2006, background): “Povinelli and colleagues (Povinelli 2000, 2004; Povinelli & Bering 2002; Povinelli & Vonk 2003, 2004 ), for example, have argued that primates’ successful performance in theory of mind tasks can be explained not as mind reading per se, but instead as a sophisticated form of behaviour reading.”
Human Culture in Evolutionary Perspective (2010, result): “…has demonstrated that great apes understand something of the goals and perceptions of others and how these work together in individual intentional action — in ways very similar to young human children (see Call & Tomasello, 2008 , for a review; see Povinelli & Vonk, 2006 , for a different view).”
Social cognition by food-caching corvids. The western scrub-jay as a natural psychologist (2007, background): “they hide food items for future consumption, and rely on memory to recover their caches at a later date (see Shettleworth (1995) for a review).”
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds (2008, unknown): “…and that our ability to do so relies on a unique representational system that has been grafted onto the cognitive architecture we inherited from our nonhuman ancestors (Povinelli 2000; 2004; Povinelli & Giambrone 2001; Povinelli & Preuss 1995; Povinelli & Vonk 2003; 2004; Vonk & Povinelli 2006).”
Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind" (2013, background): “For example, on chimpanzees: Povinelli & Vonk (2004); Vonk & Povinelli (2006, pp. 364- 5); and on scrub-jays and chimpanzees: Penn & Povinelli (2007).”