What S in it for Me? Ceos Whose Firms are Acquired
By Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek, David Yermack. 2004
406 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9f0297ebad36466227467e0862b1eb0b0e49f5d1
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Nihat Aktas
- Alex Edmans
- Eric de Bodt
- Xavier Gabaix
- Richard Roll
- Yaniv Grinstein
- Dirk Jenter
- David Yermack
In Strategy and Management
- Alex Edmans
- René M. Stulz
- Alma Cohen
- Yaniv Grinstein
- L. Bebchuk
- Xavier Gabaix
- Nihat Aktas
- Eric de Bodt
Citations in the corpus
- How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS (2006, background): “Overall, then, the severance payments in Yermack (2006) and Hartzell et al. (2004) do not seem large enough to alter the conclusion that the job of CEO has become riskier and that the shorter expected tenures of CEOs partially offset the increases in CEO pay.”
- The Pre-Deal Phase of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda (2020, background): “Furthermore, it has been suggested that target CEOs may be biased to accept a lower premium in exchange for a future position in the merged firm (Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004) or special deal-related bonuses (J. Cai & Vijh, 2007; Fich, Rice, & Tran, 2016; Hartzell et al., 2004).”
- The Costs of Entrenched Boards (2005, positive): “Furthermore, incumbents might use whatever additional power comes with such protection to extract side payments for themselves rather than higher premia for shareholders (Bebchuk, 2002; Hartzell et al., 2004).”
- Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control (2005, neutral): “Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) suggest that target managers do so at the cost of a lower premium.”
- Golden Handshakes: Rewards for Ceos Who Leave (2004, positive): “According to a recent study of 311 largefirm acquisitions by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), 69% of all target company CEOs received golden parachutes after their firms were taken over, and these parachutes provided mean payments of $1.46 million.”
- Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers (2008, positive): “In particular, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that target abnormal returns are less when the target’s CEO receives large personal benefits from the acquisition.”