Golden Handshakes: Rewards for Ceos Who Leave
By David Yermack. 2004
156 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a106a189a5e0b315c1a22719c27559953321d69d
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Citations in the corpus
- Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay (2011, unknown): “amined by Yermack (2006), Rusticus examines expected severance payments based on ex ante”
- Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment (2012, background): “…payoff (including the initial effort cost) if the board does not have the option to replace the incumbent CEO at 8In his study of 179 turnover cases, Yermack (2006) finds that departing executives generally forfeit stock options and shares that have not yet vested unless the executives have…”
- The Executive Turnover Risk Premium (2014, background): “Actual severance payments often have a discretionary component beyond contractually agreed amounts (Yermack, 2006).”
- How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS (2006, background): “For internal turnover, Yermack (2006) finds that this tends to be the default policy for most companies and companies deviate from those policies in only 16% of the internal turnovers he studies.”