The Costs of Entrenched Boards

By L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen. 2005

1,064 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75c34294683d10b713cbea2d5a35f0ec4c8e5419

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (2013, positive): “Specifically, we exclude Insider Ownership [t-1] (and 9 One difference in our cross-sectional analysis and the analysis of Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) is that they use industryadjusted Tobin's Q, defined as the firm's Q minus the median Q in the firm's industry in the observation year.”
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (2017, background): “20For a discussion of how staggered boards (often in combination with poison pills) can impede takeover bids, see Bebchuk and Cohen (2005). Daines et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that staggered boards can increase shareholder welfare for reasons other than those emphasized here.”
Rank-Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance (2009, background): “12 Palia (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) are among many studies that use Firm q and ROA as measures of firm performance.”
Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions (2019, background): “…of entrenchment is related to lower returns and lower firm value (Franks et al., 2001; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Cremers and Nair, 2005; see Straska and Waller (2014) for a survey of this literature).27 While these studies examine the…”
Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Professors in the Boardroom (2014, methodology): “Following prior studies, such as Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and Devos, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2009), we control for board and firm characteristics that may affect Q in our regressions.”
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns (2007, methodology): “To examine this possibility, we focus on a subsample of bidders that went public prior to 1990, after which institutional investors began to consistently vote against staggered boards and other takeover defenses (Bebchuk and Cohen (2004)).”
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States (2010, neutral): “2 In addition to the papers cited above, see Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002); Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003); Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); and Cremers and Nair (2005).”
Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation (2006, neutral): “Our definition of Tobin’s Q is common in the economics, law and finance literatures (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005 ).”
Risky Lending: Does Bank Corporate Governance Matter? (2017, positive): “Columns (4)–(6) of Table 2 use borrower size (natural log of assets and natural log of revenue) and profitability (return on assets, ROA) as alternative measures of borrower riskiness.”
Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity (2016, background): “Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and Shan and McIver (2011) find that independent directors decrease value.”
The Incentives for Tax Planning (2012, methodology): “(2003), Daines and Klausner (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and”