How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS

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Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (2013, unknown): “8% forced CEO turnover rate reported by Kaplan and Minton (2012) for a sample of Fortune 500 firms for 1992 – 2005.”
Rank-Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance (2009, background): “Kaplan and Minton (2006) argue that the average tenure of the CEO has reduced over the years.”
Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors (2010, unknown): “The base specification is similar to that of Kaplan and Minton (2006), except that they use the S&P 500 as a proxy for the market while we use the CRSP equally-weighted index since our sample includes many smaller firms.”
The effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms (2017, background): “For example, since innovation activities are associated with high risks, the concern about being fired when innovation fails might discourage managers from investing in R&D (Kaplan and Minton, 2006; Aghion et al., 2013).”
Innovation and Institutional Ownership (2013, unknown): “The pressure for quarterly results may induce a short-term focus ( Porter 1992 and the risk of being fired ( Kaplan and Minton 2006 might dis-suade risk-averse managers from innovating.”
Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (2010, unknown): “(See Kaplan and Minton (2006)).”