On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design

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Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017, unknown): “This is a Bayesian persuasion environment à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Rayo and Segal (2010),(1) with a novelty that the receiver has private information (type) about his tastes. Numerous natural applications fit this environment: public educational campaigns, optimal certification policies”
Pricing Network Effects (2016, background): “This highlights that the effects of type dispersion under the richer price regimes considered below are due to price discrimination and not demand rotation à la Johnson and Myatt (2006). where we recall that p is the expected average price paid by a (randomly chosen) consumer’s neighbor.”
The Economic Analysis of Advertising (2005, background): “A tension between the better-matching and reduced-sales effects of advertising also arises in the monopoly models analyzed by Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006). Lewis and Sappington consider a monopolist that may use advertising to supply pre-purchase information to buyers.”
Online advertising and privacy (2014, unknown): “g Lewis and Sappington (1994), Johnson and Myatt (2006), Anderson and Renault (2006)).”
How Does the Variance of Product Ratings Matter? (2012, background): “It is noteworthy that Johnson and Myatt (2006) examine demand transformation that results from changes in consumer taste dispersion.”