Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

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Markets for Information: An Introduction (2018, background): “Related to this problem, Kremer, Mansour, and Perry (2014) and Che and Hörner (2017) analyze the information design problem of a benevolent planner who wishes to induce a sequence of uninformed, short-lived agents to engage in socially useful (but privately costly) experimentation.”
Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach (2018, background): “Kolotilin et al. (2017) allow the sender to condition mechanisms on the receiver’s reports, and provide simple sufficient conditions for optimality of upper-censorship – a special case of the interval revelation mechanisms characterized in this paper.(3) (2)In Section 4, I discuss in more details ho”
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion (2019, methodology): “…duality; we bypass this difficulty by studying the limit of a sequence of 9 Related models of persuasion with a privately informed receiver (but not using duality techniques) are considered by Guo and Shmaya (2019) and Kolotilin et al. (2017). perturbed problems where the interior is nonempty.”
Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019, unknown): “We now add an additional investment decision, to invest small, to the 16 Kolotilin et al. (2017) showed such an equivalence under a different set of assumptions.”