The Role of CEO’s Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility
By Michele Fabrizi, C. Mallin, Giovanna Michelon. 2014
373 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/946e92e183626ab743b052b27cc08f962bdc2459
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Isabel‐María García‐Sánchez
- Jennifer Martínez‐Ferrero
- M. Muttakin
- Dessalegn Getie Mihret
- Arifur Khan
- A. Cheung
- Shantanu Banerjee
- Saverio Bozzolan
In Strategy and Management
- Jennifer Martínez‐Ferrero
- Isabel‐María García‐Sánchez
- Jean‐Pascal Gond
- M. Muttakin
- Arifur Khan
- Dessalegn Getie Mihret
- Shantanu Banerjee
- A. Cheung
Citations in the corpus
- The Effect of Board Capital and CEO Power on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures (2016, background): “Previous studies have investigated the association between CSR disclosures and board characteristics such as board independence and incentives (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Harjoto and Jo 2011; Fabrizi et al. 2013).”
- The psychological microfoundations of corporate social responsibility: A person-centric systematic review (2017, background): “Fabrizi et al. (2014) also note that power motives may combine”
- Corporate Social Responsibility as a Strategic Shield Against Costs of Earnings Management Practices (2014, methodology): “The CSR information is collected from the EIRIS database.3 This database is widely used in the industry and in academic research, including Brammer et al. (2006), Scholtens and Dam (2007), Louche et al. (2012), Dam and Scholtens (2012) or Fabrizi et al. (2013).”
- Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Quality: International Evidence (2015, background): “The underlying motivation for using this instrument is that CSR orientation tends to be correlated in given industries (Fabrizi et al., 2014; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997), but arguably the industry CSR orientation is not related to the EM policies of a single firm(5).”
- Alignment Versus Monitoring: An Examination of the Effect of the CSR Committee and CSR-Linked Executive Compensation on CSR Performance (2021, background): “Both parties are responsible for the firm’s strategy and may be directly involved in promoting CSR activities (Fabrizi et al., 2014; Waldman et al., 2006).”
- Corporate social responsibility and corporate cash holdings (2016, background): “…incumbent managers of firms with strong corporate governance may use relationships with stakeholder activists as an effective entrenchment strategy, suggesting that strong corporate governance is associated with high CSR (Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Surroca and Tribo, 2008; Fabrizi et al., 2014).”
- Corporate social responsibility and CEO confidence (2017, neutral): “Fabrizi et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between the age of the CEO and CSR, although some other studies have not found any relationship, including Godos-Diez et al. (2011).”