Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation

By Lin Peng, A. Röell. 2008

224 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92b9a83f304d532817f88130a1badfbd7168d40a

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Citations in the corpus

Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, background): “…interests in the normal course of events, the accumulated research tends to conclude that stock-based compensation also induces managers to take excessive risks (Agarwal & Mandelker, 1987) and encourages short-term profitmaximizing (Peng & Roell, 2008), which can undermine longterm firm value.”
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “Also Peng and Röell (2008) and Bebchuck and Spaman (2010) argue that stock-based compensation causes executives to focus n the short-term stock price developments.30 Mehran (1992) documents a positive relationship betwe n the firm’s leverage and the executives’ compensation in incentiv schemes.”
Rank and File Employees and the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options (2016, unknown): “Peng and Roell (2008) and Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010), among others, have used class action litigation to capture financial misrepresentation.”
Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, unknown): “Moreover, Peng and Röell (2008a) find that incentive pay in the form of options increases the likelihood of securities class action litigation.”
Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (2010, background): “A number of papers predict that accounting restatements will be positively associated with poor governance and find support for this prediction (Farber, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Peng and Röell, 2008; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006).”
Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks (2011, background): “These findings indicate that, prior to the crisis, bank executives were increasing short-term performance to max out their variable compensation (such as bonuses), at the expense of long-term performance, as suggested by prior studies including Peng and Röell (2008) and Healy (1985).”
Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs (2010, background): “Many papers have used lawsuits to proxy for the presence of corporate financial fraud (e.g., Beasley 1996, Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 1999, and Li 2008 use AAERs; Helland 2004, Srinivasan 2005, Fich and Shivdasani 2007, and Peng and Röell 2008 use class-action lawsuits).”
The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management (2016, unknown): “ 33 See Cheng and Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006, 2008) and Peng and Roell (2008).”
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (2013, unknown): “W 6 V0L �CE �� (� + 1) �+1 ( 24 ) and clearly this condition must be met if the …rm’s shareholders are to be willing to participate.”