Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments

By Daniel Houser, Robert Kurzban. 2002

302 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/90006b072199aa2388f8d2b7366f8c816b9e0e14

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Citations in the corpus

When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods (2004, background): “…extensively and the role of 55 being unfamiliar with the incentives of public goods has been examined to a lesser degree 56 (Andreoni, 1988, 1995; Houser and Kurzban, 2002), there has been little economic research 57 that isolates the non-punishment, or imitation, role of conformity in the…”
Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising (2004, background): “See Andreoni (1995) and Houser and Kurzban (2002) .”
Tax compliance and psychic costs: Behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker (2016, unknown): “…is unaffected by the previously reported empirical finding that repetition in public good experiments results in decreased cooperation, an observation that has intensified discussion on whether confusion and inexperience are driving forces for such results (Houser and Kurzban 2002, Ledyard 1995).”
SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS (2013, unknown): “mistakes (Anderson et al., 1998; Houser and Kurzban, 2002 ).”
The Experimetrics of Public Goods: Inferring Motivations from Contributions (2005, background): “Designs which compare play against computers with that against people indicate that the error rate may nonetheless be substantial (Kurzban and Houser, 2001; Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Ferraro et al., 2003) investigate motivational heterogeneity, in a game where subjects repeatedly make a provisiona”
Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments (2008, background): “…in contributions in the strangers environment primarily is caused by a decrease in errors (see e.g. Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1996; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). changes in contributions between supergames as being due to learning.4 Second, in determining the role of strategic play…”
Pro-social behavior in a natural setting (2004, background): “Houser and Kurzban (2002) show in their public goods game that the decay in cooperation can be explained by a reduction in confusion and that “it does not seem that cooperation due to social motives decays much with rounds” (p. 1066).”
Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans (2011, background): “Consequently, while it is Table 5 Kin selection and new group section Area Papers claiming that a result requires group selection Papers showing equivalent result can be obtained with kin selection / inclusive fitness Sex ratios with local mate competition Colwell, 1981; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson”
NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “Numerous attempts have been made to explain these observations (see e.g. Andreoni, 1995a; Houser and Kurzban, 2002, for a lively discussion of whether contributions are driven by kindness or confusion), and one promising line of research has focused on the presence of types such as conditional and…”
The Effect of Social Category on Third Party Punishment (2007, background): “Indeed, evidence from studies in humans (e.g., Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr, 2006; Carpenter and Matthews, 2005; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Houser and Kurzban, 2002; Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura, 2004) and non-human species (e.g., Clutton-Brock, Price, and MacColl, 1992; de Waal, 1982; Hauser,…”