Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments
By L. Muller, Martin Sefton, Richard Steinberg, Lise Vesterlund. 2008
111 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f259aac0285ae24db915ecbf3eb17858c4a9054
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- Christian Thöni
- Simon Gächter
- E. Renner
- Stefan Volk
- Winfried Ruigrok
- Ernst Fehr
- Armin Falk
- Urs Fischbacher
In Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
In Safety Research
- Christian Thöni
- Simon Gächter
- E. Renner
- Winfried Ruigrok
- Stefan Volk
- Ernst Fehr
- Urs Fischbacher
- Ananish Chaudhuri
Citations in the corpus
- Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2018, unknown): “However, few experiments involve repetitions of finitely repeated linear VCMs (with rematching between each supergame): Andreoni & Petrie (2004, 2008), Muller et al. (2008), and Lugovskyy et al. (2017). Andreoni & Petrie (2004, 2008) do not consider the e↵ect of experience on behavior. Hence, result”
- The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments (2012, unknown): “Muller et al. (2008) compare the strategy method with the direct response method, but in a between-subject design where subjects also play both the game in the strategy method and the direct response mode repeatedly.”
- The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments (2010, background): “1977), or it might be an expression of reciprocity or “conditional cooperation” in general (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Croson 2007; Kocher et al. 2008; Muller et al. 2008; Herrmann and Thöni 2009; Neugebauer et al. 2009; Thöni et al. 2009).”
- Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods (2006, unknown): “Muller et al. (2005) classify 35 percent as “selfish subjects” who give nothing in the second stage irrespective of the first stage contribution of the other players.”
- The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons (2011, unknown): “20 Muller et al. (2008) uses a two-stage voluntary-contribution mechanisms.”
- Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences (2012, result): “15 This result is remarkably similar to the findings of Muller et al. (2008), who examine 60 subjects playing a comparable game in 5 repetitions within the same experimental session.”