Is China's Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement Actions

By Gong-meng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao, Oliver M. Rui. 2005

275 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8fa69ddf338494ac44fea9cb5d9fcbbcc1866bb1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Wenxuan Hou
2. Michael Firth
3. Wenfeng Wu
4. Oliver M. Rui
5. G. Moore
6. Sofia Johan
7. Liping Xu
8. Kun Wang

In Finance

1. Wenfeng Wu
2. Wenxuan Hou
3. G. Moore
4. Kun Wang
5. Oliver M. Rui
6. Dejia Li
7. Sofia Johan
8. Michael Firth

Citations in the corpus

• Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market (2007, background): “sanctioned for fraud by the CSRC and stock exchanges (Chen et al. 2005).”
• Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China (2014, unknown): “However, prior research has shown that firms that commit fraud are also more likely to fire their CEOs (Chen et al. 2005; Firth et al. 2011).”
• Market Reactions to the First-Time Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility Reports: Evidence from China (2016, methodology): “Similar to prior studies (e.g., Haw et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2005; Griffin and Sun 2013), in our main tests we use market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (Brown and Warner 1985) as a measure of market valuation.”
• Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies (2008, background): “, Barclay and Holder ness (1991), Franks and Mayer (2001)) have shown that control transfers do have an impact on the stock prices of the companies concerned.”
• Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, unknown): “Moreover, Chen et al. (2013) report that the presence of auditors can serve as an external governance mechanism that also mitigates the fraudulent behavior of executives.”
• Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, background): “As Chen et al. (2005) contend, enforcement actions generally reduce firm value.”
• Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China (2010, background): “12 Chen et al. (2005) argue that the CSRC is not a “toothless tiger.”
• Social Trust and Corporate Misconduct: Evidence from China (2018, methodology): “(1995) and Chen et al. (2010), we use Zstatistics to test the significance of the differences in regression coefficients between the two subsamples.”
• Acquisition Announcements and Stock Market Valuations of Acquiring Firms’ Rivals: A Test of the Growth Probability Hypothesis in China (2011, unknown): “6 Many recent studies have run event study analyses to measure Chinese stock market reactions and found significant cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates during short event windows (e.g. Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang, 2010; Chen et al., 2005; Firth, Lin, and Zou, 2010; Miller et al., 2”
• Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud (2010, methodology): “Meanwhile, the state remains influential in the legal and financial regulatory system, undermining judicial and regulatory independence (Chen, 2003; Allen et al., 2005; and Chen et al., 2005).”
• Cooking the books : recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China (2011, unknown): “9 (Chen et al., 2005).”