Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud

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Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, background): “Hou and Moore (2010) examine the effect of state ownership on the incidence of enforcement against fraud, whereas we consider two new determinants, namely political connections and institutional ownership.”
Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, methodology): “We follow previous studies such as Erickson et al. (2006), Efendi et al. (2007), Jia et al. (2009), Hou and Moore (2010), and Armstrong et al. (2013) to create a matched-sample based on an outcome-based matching procedure.”
Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China (2014, unknown): “influence on operations of these firms and shield managers from enforcement actions (Fan et al. 2007; Hou and Moore 2010).”
Corporate Governance and Performance in Socially Responsible Corporations: New Empirical Insights from a Neo‐Institutional Framework (2013, unknown): “Third, ownership structures (i.e., by block, government, and institutions) can mitigate or exacerbate agency problems (Eng & Mak, 2003; Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Hou & Moore, 2010).”