Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China

By H. Berkman, Rebel A. Cole, Lawrence J. Fu. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2010

359 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9d42ad2d5cfaa02c7572ac10e102cd5185c8ac29

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Citations in the corpus

Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes (2016, neutral): “4 the firms to themselves typically via connected party transactions (Berkman et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010).”
Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “Finally, Berkman et al. [2011] study three regulatory changes designed to protect minority shareholders against the expropriation by the government as the majority shareholder (state intervention).”
Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, background): “63The closest is Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), who estimate a related mixed model: they examine a regression with on-and-off treatment dummies in years t-1 and t (to check for pre-treatment trends), year t+1, and years (t+2 and after); Qiu and Yu (2009) similarly estimate separate effects in yea”
Minority Shareholders’ Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China (2013, background): “7 Prior China related event studies also use relatively long periods to measure abnormal returns (e.g., Fan et al. 2008; Berkman et al. 2010).”
Rise of the Fiduciary State: A Survey of Sovereign Wealth Fund Research (2014, neutral): “In addition to the aforementioned Bertoni and Lugo (2013), who develop a generalized model but test it on GPFG’s portfolio, two studies focus explicitly on the optimal and actual asset allocations of the GPFG.”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “, 2011) and are thus less likely to be disciplined by the capital market (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Berkman et al., 2011).”
Reputation concerns of independent directors: : Evidence from individual director voting (2015, neutral): “Following Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2010), we use the annual aggregate value of " non-beneficial " related-party transactions for each firm divided by the firm's year-end total assets (RPT/Assets).”
Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, positive): “For example, Berkman et al. (2010) find evidence from stock market returns in China implying that minority investors perceive that regulators will fail to protect their interests by strictly enforcing new governance standards when the firm has a controlling owner with political connections.”
Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms (2013, positive): “Lack of political connection also makes firms less immune to government regulations (Berkman et al., 2010).”