Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies
By Gong-meng Chen, Michael Firth, Y. Xin, Liping Xu. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2008
193 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7597b50fa6339f3052e4d39acb2b7210825e1a35
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Citations in the corpus
- The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings (2014, unknown): “Third, we enrich the literature (e.g., see Cull and Xu, 2005; Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Lin, Lin and Zou, 2012; Firth et al., 2013; Zou and Adams, 2008; Ayyagari et al., 2010) on corporate finance in China, a large and growing economic power, by providing evidence on the cash holding…”
- Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “In the second paper Chen et al. [2013], they use a sample of statecontrolled Red-chip firms in Hong Kong between 1990 and 2005 and find that the directors forfeited a significant portion of their vested inthe-money stock options.”
- Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, unknown): “Consistent with their conjecture, Chen et al. (2008a) document that family firms provide more earnings warnings than non-family firms.”
- Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud (2010, background): “Given the institutional features that the state still retains some ownership in many privatised firms i.e. non-SOEs (Chen et al., 2008), and the evidence that state ownership holds back the information environment (Gul et al., 2010), corporate governance (Cheung et al., 2010), and consequently…”
- Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2010, unknown): “Company ownership structure in China is highly concentrated by international standards, and the largest shareholder usually has effective control over the firm (Chen et al. (2008)).”
- The effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms (2017, background): “The largest shareholder usually controls the firm effectively (Chen et al., 2008).”
- Firm Profitability, State Ownership, and Top Management Turnover at the Listed Firms in China: A Behavioral Perspective (2009, unknown): “Another study (Chen et al., 2008) finds that a change in the largest shareholder at the listed firms in China has a positive effect on firm profitability when control is passed from a state entity to a private entity, but has no effect when control is passed from one state entity to another state en”
- The relationship among information asymmetry, dividend policy and ownership structure (2017, background): “In addition, firms with concentrated ownership may disclose less information, making the problem of information asymmetry between the management and external shareholders more severe (Attig et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008).”
- Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China's listed companies (2009, methodology): “We use operating earnings rather than net income because the latter measure is prone to manipulation (Chen et al., 2008).”
- The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2014, background): “They are less concerned with the quality of public accounting information as firms' share price is irrelevant to their wealth (Chen et al., 2008).”