Controlling Stockholders and the Disciplinary Role of Corporate Payout Policy: A Study of the Times Mirror Company

By H. DeAngelo, L. DeAngelo. 2000

345 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8eadfd6989ece1e29e7ca8718e329bec4c9aa404

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms (2007, neutral): “…out minority shareholders (Gilson and Gordon, 2003), by taking a disproportionate share of corporate earnings in the form of special dividends (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000), by engaging in related-party transactions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), and through managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and…”
Are Founding Families Special Blockholders? - An Investigation of Controlling Shareholder Influence on Firm Performance (2014, neutral): “A study of the Times Mirror Company by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) clearly shows the negative effects such a situation can produce.”
The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange (2012, background): “Demsetz (1983) explains that the owner chooses the consumption of nonpecuniary resources at the expense of resources for profitable projects.”
The influence of family ownership on SME performance: evidence from public firms in Taiwan (2009, background): “The first category of research is based on the agency theory and emphasizes the wealth expropriation behaviors pertaining to the concentration of family ownership ( DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000; Demsetz 1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Fama and Jensen 1983; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001; Morck et al. 2000), wh”
Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities (2006, background): “Thus some researchers have argued that family-dominated businesses are more apt to be characterized by extraordinary dividend payouts (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000), Agency Costs Stewardship Attitudes • Family Ownership & Control • Family Management • Multiple Family Owners &/or Managers • Multiple…”
Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence From Public Companies in Chile (2007, background): “This expropriation is usually done though excessive compensation, related-party transactions, or special dividends (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000).”
Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003, background): “DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) suggest that the family’s desire for special dividends can impact the ¢rm’s capital expansion plans, leading to poor operating and stock price performance.”
Exploring the relation between family involvement and firms' financial performance: A meta-analysis of main and moderator effects (2012, background): “…al., 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), reduced value of the firm (Barclay and Holderness, 1989), special dispensation or compensation (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Schack, 2001), lack of incentive to share wealth (Burkart et al., 1997; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000), nepotism (Pollack, 1985),…”
Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size (2011, background): “owners such as founding families are likely to underperform those firms with a dispersed ownership structure ( DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung, 2000).”
Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies (2013, background): “ DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) find that large shareholders in public firms extract private rents through extraordinary dividends, excessive compensations schemes and related-party transactions.”
Family Involvement in Ownership and Management: Exploring Nonlinear Effects on Performance (2008, background): “Families can be capable of reducing firm value through excessive compensation, related-party transactions, or special dividends (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000).”