Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

By Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb. 2003

5,453 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ffb833fab60a3c760ea2a5338bbdd728d956fb05

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Citations in the corpus

Socioemotional Wealth as a Mixed Gamble: Revisiting Family Firm R&D Investments with the Behavioral Agency Model (2013, positive): “The starting point for identifying the list of family firms were the lists of firms identified as family-controlled by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and by Gomez-Mejia, Makri, and Larraza-Kintana (2010).”
Does founding family control affect earnings management? (2009, methodology): “3 This proportion of family-owned firms is remarkably consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003a,b; 2004). They find that one-third of their sample is family owned. (4)Anderson and Reeb (2003a,b, 2004) make their classification of family firms available to the public. More detailed discussions about t”
Family-firm risk-taking: Does religion matter? (2015, neutral): “Anderson and Reeb (2003a) argue that many family-firms may adopt business policies to pursue value-maximization instead of policies to pursue mere survival.”
Family ownership, financing constraints and investment decisions (2011, positive): “In order to investigate the influence of the so-called ‘founder effect’ observed in various performance studies of family firms (e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) for the US, Andres (2008) for Germany), the family dummy variable was broken down into three sub-categories: a family firm is…”
Creating Value Across Generations in Family-Controlled Businesses: The Role of Family Social Capital (2008, background): “One research stream empha- sizes the idea that the unification of ownership and control in FCBs may reduce agency costs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).”
Organizational Virtue Orientation and Family Firms (2011, background): “…and has been utilized to examine relevant topics such as the financial impact of firms’ ethical behaviors (e.g., Van der Laan, Van Ees, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2008) and differences between large family and non-family firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Short et al., 2009).”
Article Commentary: Family, Wealth, and Governance: An Agency Account (2015, background): “A closer look at the agency literature, which figures most prominently in explaining the governance of family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), reveals that authors largely assume away the existence of heterogeneous interests,…”
Firm Innovation in Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance, and Competition (2011, background): “Several papers posit that family owned and managed firms are better able to mitigate agency problems and that founders bring valuable skills to the firm and hence are more valuable (e.g., Khanna and Palepu (2000), Anderson and Reeb (2003)).”