Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty
By J. Mirrlees. 2006
323 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b6fd8b1d4f8bd5abedc716ab724b48cbb285090
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Marc Fleurbaey
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Citations in the corpus
- Optimal Compensation with Hidden Action and Lump-Sum Payment in a Continuous-Time Model (2009, methodology): “This approach is first suggested by Mirrlees [16, 17], as explained nicely in [12, p. 77].”
- Subjective expected utility theory without states of the world (2006, unknown): “The latter formulation, pioneered and popularized by Mirrlees (1974, 1976), is analytically convenient and is often used in applications.”
- Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All! (2009, background): “The studies by Mirrlees (1974) and Varian (1980), recently extended to an environment in which households can save by Reiter (2004), replace the policy maker’s concern for equity by an insurance motive; by making after-tax incomes less volatile, a progressive tax system may provide partial income…”
- Fair Income Tax (2006, background): “Mirrlees (1974), indeed, proved that utilitarian first-best allocations had to display the property that high-skilled agents envy lowskilled agents, that is, the former are assigned bundles on lower indifference curves than the latter.8 In contrast, a first-best allocation maximizing mini Wi (zi )…”
- Compensation and responsibility (2011, background): “62In the production model of Section 3, when agents have identical utility functions ui( , c), a utilitarian planner would choose a Pareto-efficient allocation such that agents with higher skill obtain a lower utility, as shown by Mirrlees (1974).”
- Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment (2008, background): “1See, for example, Mirrlees (1974), Mirrlees (1976), Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom (1982), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Grossman and Hart (1983), Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), for important formative work in the voluminous literature…”
- Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study (2012, unknown): “The experiment was pro- 10In choosing the noise structure, we were mainly inspired by the contract theory literature on hidden action, starting with Mirrlees (1974, 1975), where it is standardly assumed that if an agent does not make any effort then the observed outcome is failure for sure, while…”
- Incentives Between Firms (and Within) (2005, methodology): “This solution to the classic model is tidy but flawed: Mirrlees (1974) showed that the best linear contract, w = s + b*y, is inferior to various non-linear contracts.”