Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
By Robert Gibbons. Management Sciences, 2005
372 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/61193ed872d26830c1c8af4120cb2af9cda3952c
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Andrew A. King
- Maria Guadalupe
- Cyndi Man Zhang
- K. G. Huang
- Nan Jia
- V. Cuñat
- Tomasz Obloj
- Douglas H. Frank
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Cyndi Man Zhang
- K. G. Huang
- Nan Jia
- Andrew A. King
- Tomasz Obloj
- Maria Guadalupe
- Douglas H. Frank
- V. Cuñat
Citations in the corpus
- Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, positive): “The linear contract shape can be interpreted via the aggregation argument from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987); see Gibbons (2005) for a simplified account.”
- Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking (2014, background): “This is the essential feature of agency models such as those in Baker (1992) and Gibbons (2005).”
- Public Governance, Corporate Governance, and Firm Innovation: An Examination of State-Owned Enterprises (2019, positive): “ignore the prospect that activities that are not captured by the focal metrics (which thus receive insufficient investment from them) would have contributed to firm value (Baker, 1992; Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; Gibbons, 1998; for a review, see, e.g., Predergast, 1999; Gibbons, 2005).”
- Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition (2009, background): “[22] Gibbons, Robert.”
- How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, neutral): “Principal–agent theory is the most widely used economic theory of incentives (for overviews, see Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbons, 2005; Prendergast, 1999).”
- Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, neutral): “See Gibbons (2005) for a review.”
- Cooperation between corporations and environmental groups: A transaction cost perspective (2007, background): “This investment in an inferior technology in order to improve one’s bargaining position may seem unlikely, but it has been documented in many for-profit transactions (Gibbons, 2005b).”
- Control-based channel governance and relative dependence (2010, background): “The suggestion of replaceability shortens the time horizon of the relationship and the accompanying fair distribution of rewards (Gibbons 2005), weakening the motivation to overlook day-to-day disagreements.”