Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations

By E. Capen, R. V. Clapp, W. Campbell. 1971

Subfields: Game & Decision Theory, Economics & Operations Research

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Citations in the corpus

Taming the Noise in Reinforcement Learning via Soft Updates (2015, background): “This problem is akin to the “winner’s curse” in auctions [6, 7, 8, 9].”
Hiring Stars and Their Colleagues: Exploration and Exploitation in Professional Service Firms (2009, background): “12The winner’s curse phenomenon was first identified in the context of firms submitting bids for oil drilling rights and gas leases to a parcel of land (Capen et al. 1971).”
Optimal Thresholding of Classifiers to Maximize F1 Measure (2014, background): “In such situations, the optimal threshold can be subject to a winner’s curse [2] where a sub-optimal threshold is chosen because of sampling effects or limited training data.”
Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents? (2006, background): “phenomenon is known as the “winner’s curse” ( Capen, Clapp, and Campbell, 1971 ).”
The Optimizer's Curse: Skepticism and Postdecision Surprise in Decision Analysis (2006, methodology): “*We thank Bob Clemen for sharing the data from Clemen and Kwit (2001) and Clemen, David Bell, the Associate Editor, and the referees for helpful comments.”
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, background): “In empirical field studies, one difficulty in definitively determining the presence of the winner’s curse is the lack of a benchmark market value for auctioned assets such as an untapped oil field ( Capen, Clapp, and Campbell, 1971; Hendricks and Porter, 1988) or a highway construction contract (Th”
Auctions in Theory and Practice (2002, background): “Pointing to the significant common-value components of these sales, a number of researchers, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971) and Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987), find evidence of the winner’s curse, with winning bidders in sealed-bid auctions earning below market rates of returns on acqui”
Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions (2007, background): “Oil companies, for instance, typically rely on groups of geologists and managers to formulate bidding strategies for bidding on offshore oil leases (Capen et al., 1971; Hoffman et al., 1991).”
Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2007, background): “petroleum engineers ( Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971) ) and studied theoretically by Wilson”
Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases) (2004, background): “…Max Bazerman, Bob Gibbons, Thomas Hellmann, Ed Lazear, Jon Levin, Sendhil Mullainathan, Paul Oyer, Drazen Prelec, Emily Pronin, Garth Saloner, Antoinette Schoar, Joel Sobel, Muhamet Yildiz, and the participants in the Stanford Strategy Conference, the Harvard-MIT Theory Seminar, the MIT…”