Auctions in Theory and Practice

By William Samuelson. 2002

566 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2b5315d8a09b1ffb133fc8439471d10f0ceda4c2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Customer Behavior Modeling in Revenue Management and Auctions: A Review and New Research Opportunities (2007, background): “Klemperer (2004) analyzes the differences in auction designs from different countries and the resulting bidder strategies, and explains why some auctions can facilitate collusion between ﬁrms and failed to attract entrants.”
Infrastructure: A survey of recent and upcoming issues (2006, background): “Laffont and Tirole (1993) catalyzed this literature, but see also Armstrong and Sappington (forthcoming), Bos (1994, 2003), Hart (2003), Newberry (2000), and Laffont (2000, 2005).”
Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008, background): “3The idea that sealed bidding may increase entry by weaker bidders is emphasized by Klemperer (2004) in the context of spectrum auctions.”
A simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons (2008, background): “First, from looking at expression (8) it is not difficult to see that a collusive agreement under the DHM mechanism would depart from the first-best allocation.”
Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why? (2006, background): “For example, ascending ‐ bid auctions may be easier to understand for inexperienced bidders and have been recommended for auctions of UK greenhouse gas emissions reductions in 2002 (Klemperer, 2004 p.135) and the New Entrants Reserve (NER) in Phase I of the EU ETS in the UK (DTI, 2005).”
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response (2015, background): “See Klemperer (2004) and Milgrom (2004, 2011) for surveys of the market design literature on auction markets and Roth (2002, 2008) for surveys on the market design literature on matching markets.”
Is There a Market for Ideas (2010, unknown): “From the design and operation of government auctions for telecommunications spectrum (McMillan, 1994; Milgrom, 2004; Klemperer, 2004; Cramton, 2002, 2008) to the evaluation of algorithms for “matching” medical residents with hospitals (Roth, 2002), to the development of online auctions for search…”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “Subsequent research on the housing market showed that both competitive and core allocations are unique when preferences are strict (Roth and Postlewaite 1977). Moreover, when the core concept is used as a direct mechanism, it is strategyproof (Roth 1982a). Subsequently, Ma (1994) showed that this is”