Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Emerging Markets

By K. Lins, Henri Servaes. 2002

450 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a49ddd62be817c53dd84093d8687931a3314ed9

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Citations in the corpus

Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking (2009, unknown): “However, Lins and Servaes (2002) reject the theory on the benefits of internal capital markets.”
The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets: Evidence from Asia's Financial Crisis (2001, background): “Finally, East Asian corporations have a record of significant use of internal markets when compared to companies in the United States, as documented in Fauver et al. (1999) and Lins and Servaes (1999b).”
Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey (2002, unknown): “Lins and Servaes (2002) also study the effect of corporate diversification 88 ß International Review of Finance Ltd. 2003 on firm value, but find opposite effects.”
Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards (2006, unknown): “See Lins and Servaes (2002) for a study of these effects in emerging markets and Denis and McConnell (2003) and LaPorta et al., (2000b) for a general overview of these issues.”
Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation (2008, background): “The latter, newer research stream, however, has mostly focused on aspects of ownership structure other than ownership concentration per se, such as insider ownership (Chang, 2003; Lins and Servaes, 2002) and the presence of large shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002).”
Beyond institutional voids: Business groups, incomplete markets, and organizational form (2015, background): “…to growth opportunities also provide a potential answer to the interesting empirical observation in the business group literature that business group affiliates are more diversified than nongroup firms across many countries (Claessens et al., 1999; George and Kabir, 2012; Lins and Servaes, 2002).”
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence from Thailand (2001, background): “Lins and Servaes (2002) also study the effect of corporate diversification”
Internal versus External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach (2003, background): “countries where capital markets are less developed. Lins and Servaes (2001) obtain a”
Impact of state ownership and control mechanisms on the performance of group affiliated companies in China (2007, background): “Empirical studies in Asian corporations suggested that higher control rights would cause a serious agency problem when diversification increases because a parent company, as the dominant owner, could extend its control to large number of companies (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Lin & Servaes, 2”
How Much of the Diversification Discount Can Be Explained by Poor Corporate Governance (2012, unknown): “Lins and Servaes (2002) find the diversification discount in their sample – including companies from seven Asian emerging markets – to be driven by firms with managerial ownership in the 10% to 30% range, where they expect managerial entrenchment to be highest.”
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? (2007, unknown): “8 This may be related to Lins and Servaes (2002) who find that, diversification is associated with a discount for firms affiliated with diversified groups in emerging markets when their groups are already diversified and there is little justification for diversification at the firm level.”