Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards

By Larry Fauver, Michael e. Fuerst. 2006

414 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0345596d26987f3584bf2bfca42b134a048d919c

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Citations in the corpus

Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (2009, positive): “The result that stakeholder governance can increase firm value rather than decrease it finds some support in Gorton and Schmid (2004) and Fauver and Fuerst (2006), although the precise mechanism through which this happens is yet to be identified empirically.”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “…Germany (Höpner & Müllenborn, 2010), no systematic evidence exists to suggest that strong employee voice at the board level has a significant negative effect on firm performance or share prices (Baums & Frick, 1998; Fauver & Fuerst, 2006; Höpner, 2004; Kraft, Stank, & Dewenter, 2009; Wagner, 2009).”
Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies (2011, background): “Columns 11 to 16 present combined dividends and repurchases 11 Fauver and Fuerst (2006) document a similar non-linear relationship between firm value and the fraction of employee board representation (not ownership), though they find that the positive impact of employee representation tails at a…”
Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?” (2012, neutral): “…literature, we control for a set of board-related variables: board size (Lückerath-Rovers 2011; Adams and Ferreira 2009, or Farrell and Hersch 2005), codetermination (Lindstaedt et al. 2011; Oehmichen et al. 2010; Fauver and Fuerst 2006), and multiple directorships (e.g., Lindstaedt et al. 2011).”
Advancing the Human Capital Perspective on Value Creation by Joining Capabilities and Governance Approaches (2015, background): “…investments would be safeguarded by those inside directors who would be elected by and responsible for those employees, and (3) a disinterested chairperson of the board would monitor the contributions of other board members for the benefit of the corporation itself (see also Fauver & Fuerst, 2006).”
Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions (2012, neutral): “For the German corporate governance system, in which employee representation on the supervisory board is typically legally mandated, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) find that labour representation provides a powerful means of monitoring and reduces agency costs, especially in firms with a greater need for…”
Do Nonfinancial Stakeholders Affect the Pricing of Risky Debt? Evidence from Unionized Workers (2012, positive): “More broadly, our paper is related to studies on the importance of labor relations for firms’ decisions and their values (e.g., Fauver and Fuerst, 2006; Faleye et al., 2006; Edmans, 2007; Atanassov and Kim, 2009).”