Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation

By Yiyi Su, Dean Xu, Phillip H. Phan. Management and Organization Review, 2008

253 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/49f33ce92c0c23c7684f49cffe08c1538581804a

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Citations in the corpus

Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China (2009, background): “First, extending the findings of Su et al. (2008) of higher agency costs under ownership concentration, this study suggests that poor firm performance is also a result of the concentrated ownership structure.”
Principal‐principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China (2013, background): “…et al ., 2000), PP conflicts are a major concern surrounding corporate governance in transition economies where property rights are weakly enforced and there are but few rules and procedures to protect minority shareholders (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001; Su et al ., 2008; Young et al ., 2008).”
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal–principal perspective (2010, background): “This ensures the dominant position of the Chinese government in corporate decisionmaking and fosters a divergence of interests between the majority shareholder (government) and the minority shareholders ( Su et al., 2008 ); the government has more than 50% of the voting rights in 31.4% of the listed”
Principal-principal conflicts during crisis (2011, background): “Second, this paper continues the stream of recent empirical work on principalprincipal conflicts (Chen & Young, 2010; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Su et al., 2008 )b y adding a finer-grained understanding of principal-principal conflicts during crisis.”
Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “Forms of expropriation include transferring assets to private holding at below market value and corporate expenditures on non-value creating activities that advance personal agenda (Su et al., 2008).”