When Does Vertical Coordination Improve Industrial Purchasing Relationships?

By A. Buvik, George John. 2000

288 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Safety Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8410142aea47cbbc48b73a7c14561e4f209edfca

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In Management Information Systems

In Safety Research

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Interorganizational Governance Value Creation: Coordinating for Information Visibility and Flexibility in Supply Chains (2007, background): “Buvik and John (2000) observed that purchasing amount may affect ex post transaction cost and adaptation in the supply chain.”
A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics (2004, result): “…the relationship between asset specificity and negotiation costs, Coles and Hesterly (1998a) found different results in public vs. private hospitals, Buvik and John (2000) found that trust could lower the transaction costs of exchange, and three studies (Gulati, 1995; Zaheer and Venkatraman,…”
Relationship Governance in a Supply Chain Network (2004, background): “However, as Buvik and John (2000) note, significant results for higher-order interaction terms in a regression model in the presence of lower-order terms mean that the imprecision (reduced power) due to multicollinearity is not a valid threat.”
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (2006, background): “Buvik and John (2000) also examine intermediate organization forms and find that greater vertical coordination, or the purposive organization of activities and information flows between independent organizations, improves adaptation to high environmental uncertainty when relationship specific…”
The Organization of Regional Clusters (2009, background): “Buvik and John (2000) have suggested that specific investments require “tying one’s hands,” which contrasts sharply with the mode of interaction that characterizes relational exchange (Macneil, 1980).”
A meta-analytic review of opportunism in exchange relationships (2008, background): “Coordination limits opportunism by curtailing adaptation problems and establishing congruent goals (Buvik and John 2000).”