Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings

By William A. Reese, Michael S. Weisbach. 2002

927 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/83ff78b64b26fc5a313fc2c6c2de85d211d6b898

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, neutral): “Bolton, and Roell (2003), Denis (2001), Denis and McConnell”
Do Country Level Investor Protections Impact Security Level Contract Design? Evidence from Foreign Bond Covenants (2012, neutral): “7,8 7 For evidence on the ability of foreign firms to opt-in ( " bond " ) to U.S. investor protections via U.S. registration, see, e.g., Reese and Weisbach (2002), Doidge et al. (2004) and Lel and Miller (2008).”
One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, neutral): “Pound (1987), Romano (1987), Karpoff and Maltesta (1989) (see Easterbrook and Fishel (1991) for a summary of”
International Cross‐Listing, Firm Performance, and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis (2006, neutral): “…Miller (2003)), lower cost of capital (Errunza and Miller (2000), Hail and Leuz (2004)), better information environments (Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2005)), lower voting premiums (Doidge (2004)), and more access to external finance (Reese and Weisbach (2002), Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005)).”
Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence (2007, background): “legal system to protect minority shareholders (Coffee, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2003).”
Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by . . renting U.S. securities laws (2005, neutral): “Reese and Weisbach (2002) find further that issuing an ADR could help firms to attract outside finance for at least two subsequent years following a U.S. listing.”
How Representative are Firms that are Cross Listed in the United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality (2003, background): “Fifty-six percent of sample firms are from code law countries, consistent with the notion in papers like Reese and Weisbach (2001) that code law firms are more attracted to full US listing because they benefit more from the bonding effect given relatively weak investor protection in their home marke”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “Future 83 As Roberts and Sufi (2009) note, both Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have extended the concept of liquidation value to encompass the idea of the redeployability of the asset and the financial condition of potential buyers.”
International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems (2007, neutral): “When firms are limited to accessing capital only from poorly developed home markets, capital constraints can occur [Reese and Weisbach (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2003), Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005), and Levine 2 For U.S. firms, Fama and French (1998) find a positive relation between value…”
Strategic and institutional effects on foreign IPO performance : Examining the impact of country of origin, corporate governance, and host country effects (2012, result): “These findings support research by Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2004) as well as that of Reese and Weisbach (2002), which shows that weaker shareholder protection in a domestic market may be one reason why a number of publicly held foreign firms have chosen to cross-list their equity shares on both…”