Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective

By Stuart L. Gillan, Laura T. Starks. 2003

998 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/09207c6baa2bcbb7a39af5c9ee8ae21f5e054db3

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Citations in the corpus

The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from Privatization (2013, neutral): “In addition, share issue privatizations open to foreign investments result in foreign ownership that is more likely to foster improvements in firm-level governance than local investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira ad Matos, 2008).”
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (2015, background): “Similarly, the work by Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2006) implies that certain corporate governance mechanisms sometimes actually exacerbate agency problems through preventing management from doing what it should and thereby reducing shareholder wealth.”
Institutional ownership stability and BHC performance (2008, neutral): “This trend has raised some interesting questions regarding the monitoring influence of institutional ownership on corporate governance and firm performance (Karpoff, 2001; Gillan and Starks, 2003).”
Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in emerging markets: Evidence of a split-share structure reform in China (2015, background): “In theory, the growth in institutional ownership and influence should result in better monitoring and governance, despite the institutional differences across markets (Gillan and Starks (2003)).”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “…Macey and O’Hara (2003) on banks and bank holding companies, Claessens and Fan (2002) on Asian corporate governance, Denis and McConnell (2003) and Gillan and Starks (2003) on international issues, Black (1998), Gillan and Starks (1998), and Karpoff (1998) on shareholder activism, and John and…”
Do state and foreign ownership affect investment efficiency? Evidence from privatizations (2017, positive): “An extensive literature on foreign institutions suggests that they play a larger role than local investors in improving corporate governance around the world (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011).”
The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world (2008, positive): “Similarly, foreign institutional investors are often believed to play more of a role in prompting changes in corporate governance practices than domestic money managers (Gillan and Starks, 2003). We conjecture that the presence of foreign and independent institutions with large stakes has the potent”
Diversified Business Groups and Corporate Refocusing in Emerging Economies (2005, background): “Because DFIs are large block shareholders, they are likely to provide monitoring behaviors similar to active institutional investor shareholders in developed economies (Gillan & Starks, 2003).”