Retailer power and supplier welfare
By P. Bloom, V. G. Perry. 2001
192 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8328f5f744e99b89dd834642e7285d4ee24f1222
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Ruixia Shi
- Jun Ru
- Jun Zhang
- Srinivasan Raghunathan
- Eric T. Bradlow
- Birendra K. Mishra
- Peter S. Fader
- Jeonghye Choi
In Marketing
- Xuanming Su
- Xiaohang Yue
- Birendra K. Mishra
- Eric T. Bradlow
- Ruixia Shi
- Jun Ru
- Jun Zhang
- Peter S. Fader
Citations in the corpus
- Do Suppliers Benefit from Collaborative Relationships with Large Retailers? An Empirical Investigation of Efficient Consumer Response Adoption (2005, background): “Bloom and Perry (2001) find that suppliers of Wal-Mart, certainly a powerful and smart retailer, with a large market share perform better than do large-share suppliers that report retailers other than Wal-Mart as their primary customers.”
- Store within a Store (2010, background): “This phenomenon of increasing retailer power has motivated recent research (e.g., Bloom and Perry 2001; Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan 2006; Geylani, Dukes, and Srinivasan 2006; Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003; Raju and Zhang 2005).”
- Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand (2013, background): “The study by Bloom and Perry (2001) using non-grocery data shows that whether suppliers benefit from their associations with Walmart depends on their respective market shares; however, Mottner and Smith (2009) test Bloom and Perry’s model on a longer time series of Compustat data, concluding that…”
- Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains (2009, background): “For instance, large retailers such as Wal-Mart Corporation have considerable power over suppliers (Bloom and Perry 2001, Business Wire 2005).”
- Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance (2008, background): “In an era with retailers becoming increasingly dominant (see Messinger and Narasimhan 1995, Bloom and Perry 2001), retailers may actively negotiate against the profit cap imposed on them by optimal buyback agreements. This suggests that using buyback contracts as a pricecommitment device may face im”