The Bright Side of Supplier Encroachment
By Anil Arya, Brian Mittendorf, D. E. Sappington. 2007
666 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/764a46f67285c2bda64f1e86c0b6dcf579700d50
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Zhuoxin (Allen) Li
- Song Huang
- Anantaram Balakrishnan
- Javad Nasiry
- Albert Y. Ha
- Xiaoyang Long
- Ying‐ju Chen
- Lin Tian
In Management Information Systems
- Xu Guan
- Ying‐ju Chen
- Song Huang
- Stephen M. Gilbert
- Albert Y. Ha
- Zhuoxin (Allen) Li
- Guoming Lai
- Xiaohang Yue
In Marketing
Citations in the corpus
- Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment (2016, methodology): “Finally, Arya et al. (2007) show that if an encroaching manufacturer has a selling cost disadvantage relative to the retailer, then the manufacturer has an incentive to lower the wholesale price to maintain the retailer channel’s demand; if the selling cost disadvantage is large enough, the downstre”
- Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information (2014, methodology): “…capability and expertise in predicting the demand, so that even if the supplier and the reseller receive the same data about the market demand, an informationally more capable reseller might be better able to interpret it and thus have a more accurate prediction of the true market size.”
- Inducing Supply Chain Transparency through Supplier Encroachment (2019, positive): “This result is driven by the traditional bright side of encroachment (Arya et al. 2007), wherein the supplier has to cut his wholesale price to preserve the retailer’s ordering incentive in the indirect channel.”
- Supplier Encroachment with a Dual‐Purpose Retailer (2021, positive): “As in Guan et al. (2019), we also extend the model setting in Arya et al. (2007) to include the case that the supplier only uses her direct channel as a threat.”
- Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain (2015, background): “Cattani et al. (2006) and Arya et al. (2007) assume price homogeneity among the two channels, both finding that the supplier may operate a direct channel that increases profits for both firms, the supplier benefiting from additional revenue and the retai-ler benefiting from a wholesale price reduction.”
- On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer (2013, background): “…provide a number of business cases of competition between an OEM and a competitive CM. Horng and Chen (2007) empirically examine why some Taiwanese CMs have shifted toward own-brand management, and Arya et al. (2007) investigate a Cournot competition model between a retailer and its supplier.”
- Browse‐and‐Switch: Retail‐Online Competition under Value Uncertainty (2014, background): “…a variety of assumptions, this research stream demonstrates that introducing a direct channel may benefit the manufacturer by reducing double marginalization (Arya et al. 2007, Chiang et al. 2003), segmenting the market (Cattani et al. 2006), or as a strategic necessity (Bern-stein et al. 2008).”
- Information Sharing in an Online Marketplace with Co‐opetitive Sellers (2020, background): “Arya et al. (2007) consider a co-opetition setting in which a manufacturer sells products through both her own direct channel and a retailer.”
- Supplier Encroachment and Investment Spillovers (2016, background): “However, in this research, the lower wholesale price is a function of the spillover effect from a manufacturer’s cost-reducing investment rather than a manufacturer’s market coordination effort shown in Arya et al. (2007).”
- Strategic Analysis of the Agency Model for Digital Goods (2017, neutral): “Arya et al. (2007) and Cattani et al. (2006) similarly develop results highlighting the benefits of the creation of a direct channel from a manufacturer to the customers in a supply chain.”