The Economic Effects of Constitutions

By John M. Carey. Perspectives on Politics, 2005

829 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/756b700b8531d0e19fc939b56fbe6ebc6eba0203

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns (2017, methodology): “6 , we employ an empirical specification that builds on the work of Potrafke (2009) and Efthyvoulou (2012) in the selection and transformation of variables, and takes the following form:”
Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others (2006, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2003), for example, have argued that single member plurality systems incentivize politicians to target spending on geographically concentrated constituencies, whereas PR, with ideally only one electoral district, encourages politicians to spend more on universalistic benefit…”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2003) were the first to study the impact of the political regime (parliamentary versus presidential) and electoral rule (proportional versus majority) on PBCs (see also Chang 2008; Efthyvoulou 2012; Klomp and de Haan 2013c; Shelton 2014).”
Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries (2009, background): “Second, selected countries systematically present some characteristics that distinguish themselves from parliamentary regimes (Persson and Tabellini, 2003).”
THE DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION A Literature Survey and New Evidence (2006, background): “…(2001) export Tavares (2003), Bonaglia et al. (2001), Frechette (2001) Trade Gurgur-Shah (2005), opennes Brunetti-Weder (2003), Knack-Azfar (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Fisman-Gatti (2002), Bonaglia et al. (2001), Frechette (2001), Wei (2000), Ades-Di Tella (1999), Laffont and N’Guessan (1999),…”
Citizens, legislators, and executive disclosure: the political determinants of fiscal transparency (2013, methodology): “To capture the maturity of electoral accountability, we use a measure of democratic age developed by Persson and Tabellini (2003).”
Democratization is the Driving Force for Technological and Economic Change (2010, neutral): “Conversely, Persson and Tabellini [19, 20] claim that constitutional arrangements have the ability to influence economic policies and economic performance, and thus patterns of socio-economic development.”
The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment (2010, positive): “However, a number of factors might mitigate this problem: if there are strong, disciplined parties that are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, party leaders may be able to prevent state officials from ext”
Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries (2013, background): “…Persson and Tabellini (2003) Presidential systems Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the political system is presidential and 0 otherwise Persson and Tabellini (2003) British legal origin Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the country has British legal origin and 0 otherwise La…”
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2007, neutral): “Persson et al. (2003) examine a more general case where parties have a skewed distribution of their voters across districts.”
The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal (2013, methodology): “Persson (2005) uses the term ”structural policies” to separate regulations from more fundamental political arrangements such as constitutions (extensively studied in Persson & Tabellini, 2003).”
The Future of Social Security (2008, positive): “A sample of OECD countries during 1960s and 1970s (Lindert, 1996) and a panel of 60 countries during the period 1960–1998 (Persson and Tabellini, 2003) produce similar findings.”
Regulation and corruption (2015, neutral): “(1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) suggest that Catholicism may make people conform more with ethical norms because of its hierarchical nature. Muslims also share that characteristic, in contrast with Protestantism, which is less hierarchical. Those same authors suggest that higher GDP per capi”
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries (2006, methodology): “To facilitate comparison with the literature referred to above, we use the data set from Persson and Tabellini (2003a, 2003b), to which we add further variables as noted.”
Lobbying, corruption and political influence (2007, neutral): “28 See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a discussion of the relationship between government structure and veto players.”
How (Not) to measure institutions (2012, methodology): “The first two measures are motivated by the work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) and the last two are taken from La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Pop Eleches, and Shleifer (2004). Judicial independence is the average of three components: (1) the tenure of highest ordinary court judges, (2) the tenure of ”