Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries

By James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen. 2006

512 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/69f71caddd904c7c2768063c23ced0caf51574c2

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Citations in the corpus

Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “Likewise, Alt and Lassen (2006a) report that, conditioning on the degree of fiscal policy transparency (see below), political budget cycles are present in a sample of 19 advanced OECD economies, which all are established democracies. They conclude that “electoral cycles in fiscal policy are not a ph”
Partisan conflict and private investment (2015, unknown): “Analyzing the effects of partisan conflict on the US budget cycle (following Alt and Lassen, 2006) or its effects on the composition of durable and nondurable consumption (as in Canes-Wrone and Ponce de Leon, 2014) could also be interesting extensions to this work.”
Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia (2006, unknown): “Numerous studies investigate the effect of fiscal rules on budget outcomes and cre(1)Alt and Lassen (2006) provide evidence that electoral cycles depend on fiscal transparency. They are less pronounced, the more fiscally transparent a country is. von Hagen and Wolff (2006) show that creative account”
The effects of local government amalgamation on public spending, taxation, and service levels : Evidence from 15 years of municipal consolidation (2016, unknown): “In the related literature on political business cycles, however, dynamic models are common (e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2005; Alt and Lassen, 2006).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “The larger the distance, the greater the utility loss from losing office and the greater the manipulation the incumbent is willing to engage into be reelected (Alt and Lassen 2006; Klomp and de Haan 2013c).”
Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens? (2007, methodology): “A wide range of indices of numerical fiscal rules, and of fiscal agencies, obtained from a comprehensive survey data by the European Commission, were utilized in the analysis.”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, background): “Alt and Lassen (2006), presented evidence that, conditioned by the degree of fiscal policy transparency, political budget cycles occur in advanced industrialized economies, and that they are larger in more politically polarized countries.”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, background): “…diversified theories 3See, inter alia, Peltzman (1992); Alesina et al. (1998); Brender (2003); Buti and van der Noord (2003); Von Hagen (2003); Andrikopoulos et al. (2004); Brender and Drazen (2005); Drazen and Eslava (2005); Mink and de Haan (2005); Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b); Schneider (2007).”
Citizens, legislators, and executive disclosure: the political determinants of fiscal transparency (2013, background): “With regard to budget (or fiscal) transparency, empirical studies have found that it improves fiscal performance (Alt and Lassen 2006), lowers sovereign borrowing costs (Glennerster and Shin 2008), and decreases corruption (Reinikka and Svensson 2004).”
Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, methodology): “Connection (BC), and Prefectural Government Experience (PGE) in columns (1)-(3), in”