Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries

By Clémence Vergne. 2009

289 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0cb2738e5351b087fd5f87a436e7ccf726e3335

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Citations in the corpus

Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, unknown): “This result is similar to those obtained by Block (2002) and Vergne (2009), but for a sample of ‘new’ democracies and developing countries rather than a sample of established/developed democracies as in our case.”
Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model (2011, background): “…that, conditional on the degree of scal transparency, political business cycles are equally likely in advanced industrialized economies (Alt and Lassen, 2006) and the misallocation of public spending is likely to endure, even though countries gain experience in electoral politics (Vergne, 2009).”
Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries (2010, background): “In this paper, however, I will focus on the influence of government ideology and do not investigate electoral cycles (see, e.g., Vergne 2009 , Katsimi and Sarantides 2010).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “The presence of such an effect is found in Vergne (2009), Aidt et al. (2011) and Benito et al. (2013b), but is rejected by Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2005) and Schneider (2010).16 The threat of losing an election is only one aspect of the context.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “…of democracy Brender and Drazen (2005, 2007, 2008), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Barberia and Avelino (2011), Klomp and de Haan (2013a) Vergne (2009), Klomp and de Haan (2013b) Level of democracy Gonzales (2002) Constitutional rules Persson and Tabellini (2003), Brender and Drazen…”
The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels (2015, background): “Politicians may themselves willingly redistribute mineral rents in the form of direct transfers, subsidies or public goods in exchange for electoral support (see Robinson and Torvik, 2005; Vergne, 2009).”
Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level (2011, background): “Finally, in a more recent study which uses a panel of developing countries from 1975 to 2001, Vergne (2009) finds evidence that election-year public spending shifts towards more visible current expenditures, in particular wages and subsidies, and away from capital expenditures.”
Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns (2017, result): “A number of studies lend empirical support to this prediction using either multi-county panel data (Schuknecht, 2000; Block, 2002; Vergne, 2009; Katsimi & Sarantides, 2012) or data for local government elections (Blais & Nadeau, 1992; Schneider, 2010; Veiga & Veiga, 2007).”