Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others

By Torben Iversen, D. Soskice. American Political Science Review, 2006

1,023 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c964dffd37849bff36cfd1a5d56821a48e29b6dd

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Citations in the corpus

The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences (2010, background): “…further and argue that a bias against socialist and labor parties is responsible for the well-known difference in the extent of redistribution (Iversen & Soskice 2006) and social transfers (Persson & Tabellini 2003) that emerged over the course of the second half of the twentieth century…”
The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences (2017, background): “If individuals are purely self-interested, we might expect to find conflict over taxing the middle class, with poor individuals favoring high taxes on all higher groups, while middle-class and wealthy individuals favor reduced taxation on themselves (Iversen and Soskice 2006).”
Economic development, income inequality and preferences for redistribution * (2010, background): “For example, studies of welfare routinely begin from the assumption that higher levels of income inequality will lead to greater demand for redistributive social policy (Moene and Wallerstein 2001, 2003; Iversen and Soskice 2001, 2006; Iversen 2005; Cusack Iversen and Rehm.”
Welfare regimes and welfare state outcomes in Europe (2012, background): “For instance, it is argued that welfare state institutions define socio-political groups of individuals being included in or excluded from social programmes and additionally profiting or losing from the benefit principle and the governance of the welfare state (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Iversen and Sos”
Varieties of capitalism in light of the euro crisis (2018, background): “…such as existing levels of debt, inflation and unemployment, but also by the extent to which the costs of alternative strategies would be borne by constituents of the governing parties – a factor likely to be influenced, in turn, by the character of electoral rules (Iversen and Soskice 2006).”
From comparing capitalisms to the politics of institutional change (2008, background): “Iversen (2005) and Soskice (Iversen and Soskice, 2006) further develop this argument using their concept of ‘welfare production regimes’.”
Labour market- versus life course-related social policies: understanding cross-programme differences (2012, background): “The same is true for proportional representation (PR) systems which are well known to facilitate the formation of pro-welfare coalitions (Iversen and Soskice 2006): since the median voter generically supports life course-related programmes, the structure of the electoral system does not affect the p”
Is Democracy Good for the Poor (2006, background): “…government will target, we must consider additional variables: the specific design of democratic institutions and the class coalitions they produce (Iversen and Soskice 2006); the collective action capacities of the lower quintiles; or perhaps the tendency of the poor in developing states to vote…”
Taxation and the worlds of welfare (2009, background): “Nevertheless, versions of this argument have recently received a great deal of attention (Iversen and Soskice, 2006) and deserve careful testing.”
Inequality in developed countries and Latin America: coordinated, liberal and hierarchical systems (2009, background): “Table 2 shows the relationship between types of political system and the partisan colour of government (Cusack & Engelhardt, 2002; Iversen & Soskice, 2006).”