Lobbying, corruption and political influence

By Nauro F. Campos, Francesco Giovannoni. Social Science Research Network, 2007

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation (2015, background): “Furthermore, lobbyists can influence representatives (Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Gilens 2012: ch. 5).”
Do political connections matter for firm innovation? Evidence from emerging markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe (2020, background): “Few studies had previously looked into potential substitution effects between different political strategies such as lobbying and corruption (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007), and we advance this agenda by providing empirical evidence of such an effect happening in the context of firm ́s innovation.”
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying (2014, unknown): “Campos & Giovannoni (2007) use World Bank Survey data to show that lobbying and corruption are substitutes and that lobbying is more likely to occur than bribery in locations with stronger institutions.”
LEGAL CORRUPTION: LEGAL CORRUPTION (2011, background): “A recent paper by Campos and Giovannoni (2007) looks at the use of lobbying and bribery by firms in transition countries – they find that they are substitutes and that lobbying seems to be more effective than bribery in influencing policy.”