TrustLite: a security architecture for tiny embedded devices

By Patrick Koeberl, Steffen Schulz, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, V. Varadharajan. 2014

383 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Privacy & Security, Signal Processing

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Martin Jaggi
2. Qiang Yang
3. Jakub Konecný
4. Peter Kairouz
5. Peter Richtárik
6. Ananda Theertha Suresh
7. Jianyu Wang
8. Sebastian U. Stich

In Hardware and Architecture

1. Dawn Song
2. Taesoo Kim
3. Ming-Wei Shih
4. Sangho Lee
5. Jianyu Wang
6. Florian Tramèr
7. Lucas Davi
8. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

In Privacy & Security

1. Peter Kairouz
2. Badih Ghazi
3. Rasmus Pagh
4. Adrià Gascón
5. Qiang Yang
6. Ziteng Sun
7. H. Brendan McMahan
8. Aurélien Bellet

In Signal Processing

1. Taesoo Kim
2. Lucas Davi
3. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
4. Florian Tramèr
5. Dawn Song
6. Ming-Wei Shih
7. Sangho Lee
8. Rasmus Pagh

Citations in the corpus

• Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2019, methodology): “While TEEs enable hardware-based remote attestations, both software-based remote attestions [351] and hybrid remote attestation designs [152, 238] were proposed in the literature and enable to trade off hardware requirements for verifiability.”
• Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX (2017, methodology): “Examples of these are secure disk encryption [33], onetime password authentication [26] outsourced Map-Reduce computations [36], Secure Virtual Disk Images [22], two-party computation [23], secure embedded devices [34,29].”
• Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, methodology): “[30], isolate software on low-cost embedded devices using a Memory Protection Unit.”
• T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, methodology): “Numerous researchers have proposed hardware-based TEE designs, such as TrInc [35], SICE [3], SecureSwitch [58], OASIS [47], TrustLite [32], and Sanctum [11].”
• Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (2020, background): “Several other TEEs explore design at layers such as hypervisors [34, 45, 61], physical memory [30, 57, 62], virtual memory [25, 37, 80], and process isolation [38, 76, 86, 87].”
• Security and privacy challenges in industrial Internet of Things (2015, methodology): “TrustLite generalizes the concept of SPM [63] and SMART [13] and supports inter-rupting tasks.”
• C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (2016, background): “Keywords remote attestation; control-flow attacks; embedded system security”