C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
By Tigist Abera, N. Asokan, Lucas Davi, Jan-Erik Ekberg, Thomas Nyman, Andrew J. Paverd, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Gene Tsudik. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016
324 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the state of a remote, and potentially malware-infected, device (prover). Most existing approaches are static in nature and only check whether benign software is initially loaded on the prover. However, they are vulnerable to runtime attacks that hijack the application's control or data flow, e.g., via return-oriented programming or data-oriented exploits. As a concrete step towards more comprehensive runtime remote attestation, we present the design and implementation of Control-FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code. We describe a full prototype implementation of C-FLAT on Raspberry Pi using its ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions. We evaluate C-FLAT's performance using a real-world embedded (cyber-physical) application, and demonstrate its efficacy against control-flow hijacking attacks.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2a022ed635f8e0448a69a929c9486bf092e7be65
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In Artificial Intelligence
Citations in the corpus
- Cyber-physical systems security: Limitations, issues and future trends (2020, background): “According to current studies carried out by [160], [161], CPS is highly prone to malicious code injection attacks [162] and code-reuse attacks [163], along with fake data injection attacks [164], zero-control data attacks [165], and finally Control-Flow Attestation (C-FLAT) attacks [160].”