Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options To All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories

By Paul D. Oyer, Scott Schaefer. 2005

652 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/70ed65bae61440dea3810538feea56642e0c0430

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Citations in the corpus

6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “in contrast to Pfeffer’s (1998) assertion, there is strong evidence that PFP produces incentive effects that are very strong under certain conditions (e.”
The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation (2007, methodology): “…indicator variables using the industry classifications from Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998).17 This allows us to capture different labor market conditions in different industries and thus to control for attraction or retention reasons that affects compensation design (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005a).”
Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment (2007, neutral): “The last two decades have seen a surge in the popularity of performance pay for individuals in executive and managerial positions, from CEOs down to middle and lower management (Hall and Liebman 1998, Hall and Murphy 2003, Oyer and Schaefer 2004).”
Rank and File Employees and the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options (2016, positive): “Prior work shows that rank and file stock option awards sort and retain employees, address local labor market competition (Oyer, 2004; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Bergman and Jenter, 2007; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009), and align the incentives of employees and shareholders (Hochberg and Lindsey, 2010).”
The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, neutral): “Indeed, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999), Oyer and Schaefer (2004), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) nd a positive relationship between incentives and risk.”
An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan (2005, result): “The results are also consistent with findings in Oyer and Schaefer (2004), who find that broad-based option plans in U.S. firms Table 5 Cross-sectional analysis of announcement period abnormal returns for adoptions of option plans by Japanese firms The sample consists of 427 option plan adoptions…”
Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure (2015, background): “Oyer (2004) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) argue that if an employee’s outside opportunities are positively correlated with his current employer’s stock price, then equity compensation serves to index the employee’s compensation to outside opportunities, which in turn aids firms with employee…”