You don't always get what you pay for: The economics of privatization

By David R. Shetterly. 2002

453 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/70853595d472555696d84af91129dba9c0f7035a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

1. A. Hefetz
2. David M. van Slyke
3. G. Bel
4. Matthew Potoski
5. T. Brown
6. C. Hammonds
7. B. Gazley
8. Huriya Jabbar

In Strategy and Management

1. M. Warner
2. G. Bel
3. Xavier Fageda
4. A. Hefetz
5. Amanda M. Girth
6. J. Johnston
7. Matthew Potoski
8. T. Brown

Citations in the corpus

• Government Contracts and “Managing the Market” (2012, background): “That logic rests squarely on the potential of competition to decrease costs and to enhance the efficiency of government programs and services (Boyne, 1998; Bretschneider & Ya Ni, 2007; Pack, 1987; Savas, 2000; Sclar, 2000).”
• Is private production of public services cheaper than public production? A meta-regression analysis of solid waste and water services (2010, methodology): “Transaction costs have been used to explain government choice in the decision to contract out (Nelson, 1997; Sclar, 2000; Hefetz & Warner, 2004, 2007).”
• “Every Kid Is Money” (2015, background): “A basic assumption underlying these policies is that more choice and competition will break up state monopolies to improve the quality and lower the costs of essential government services (Sclar, 2001).”
• Factors Influencing the Privatisation of Urban Solid Waste Collection in Spain (2003, background): “Sclar (1997, 2000) argues that one needs to take into account the theory of the organisational dimension and the distinction between spot markets and contract markets.”
• Governance and Collaboration: An Evolutionary Study of Two Mental Health Networks (2010, background): “relational contracting which occurs when an agency tries to decrease the high transactions costs associated with competitive contracting by developing a long term, trust-based relationship with a contractor (Sclar, 2000).”
• Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? Local Privatization in Spain (2006, background): “CR X X Qk i i k i i k = = = = ∑ ∑ 1 1 , HH Qi i n = = ∑ 2 1 , As mentioned in the theoretical framework section, contracting out is a dynamic process that typically converges from a competitive market to monopolistic structure (Sclar, 2000).”
• The Privatization Decision (2003, background): “The benefits of competition are at the heart of the argument for privatization (Beinecke & DeFillippi, 1999; DeHoog, 1985, 1990; Donahue, 1989; Greene, 1996; Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Kettl, 1993; Morgan, 1992; Sclar, 2000).”
• Beyond the market versus planning dichotomy: Understanding privatisation and its reverse in US cities (2007, background): “In contrast to the bureaucratic view of transaction costs, the market view argues transaction costs in public service markets are high due to complex contract specification and performance monitoring (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Kavanagh & Parker, 1999; Lowery, 1998; Sclar, 2000).”
• Managing the hollow state Collaboration and contracting (2003, background): “Economists refer to this as relational contracting (Sclar 2000).”
• Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship (2006, background): “Despite these challenges, contract relationships are developed and contractors managed, not simply because they may be economically feasible but just as often because they are politically popular (Donahue 1989; Kettl 1993; Milward and Provan 2000; Sclar 2000; Smith and Lipsky 1993).”
• Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities (2010, unknown): “…In particular, our modeling approach draws on Williamson [1975, 1985] andHolmstrom andMilgrom [1991].4More broadly, we follow Sclar (2000) and Warner and Hebdon [2001], among others, in taking a transaction cost-based view of local government privatization decisions.”
• Private finance for public goods: social impact bonds (2013, result): “This stands in contrast to the increased attention public administration scholars are giving to transaction costs of incomplete contracts and the importance of accountability in network governance arrangements (Sclar 2000; Johnston and Rozmek 2008).”
• Making public transport financially sustainable (2011, background): “The potential problems highlighted above are reminiscent of experiences with private provision of public transport in the USA during the last 30 years (Black, 1995; Kim and Wachs, 2006; Richmond, 2001; Sclar and Leone, 2001; Frick et al., 2008; Vuchic, 2005).”
• Public-Private Partnerships (2004, background): “The rapid rise of this trend among governments of the third world is not due to overwhelming evidence for the social and political benefits of enabled markets, since plenty of documentation proves otherwise (see Sclar 2000; Loftus and McDonald 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001).”