Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany
By J. Elston, L. Goldberg. 2003
183 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6d6c0829e8c78fc9b1a6ee61e939dec7818039ae
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Citations in the corpus
- CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, unknown): “McConaughy (2000) and Block (2008) report evidence consistent with this hypothesis for the US and Germany, respectively.”
- Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They are Worth, and Why They are (Still) There (2010, unknown): “Elston and Goldberg (2003) show that bank influence reduces the level of compensation for German executives.”
- Ceo gender and firm performance (2013, methodology): “…& Raman, 2005); LN (Sales) is the natural logarithm of net annual sales as reported by the firm, and this proxy is used by many, including Elston and Goldberg (2003) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003); LN (Assets) that is the natural logarithm of the total assets as reported by the firm,…”