Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They are Worth, and Why They are (Still) There

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Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies (2014, unknown): “1 Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) show similar findings in Germany.”
Universal Banks and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market (2012, unknown): “25 We also obtain consistent findings using the propensity score matching methodology employed by Drucker and Puri (2005) and Bharath et al.”
Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?” (2012, unknown): “…Germany— mostly concentrated on the role of employee or bank representatives (e.g., Bermig and Frick 2011a; Fauver and Fuerst 2006 for the former and Dittmann et al. 2010 for the latter) and where only very recently gender issues have been tackled (Lindstaedt et al. 2011; Oehmichen et al. 2010;…”
The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths (2010, background): “In recognizing directors’ competence and incentives to perform this monitoring task, Fama and Jensen (1983) note that the majority of independent directors are managers or decision makers who care about their reputation.”
Endogeneity in CEO power: A survey and experiment (2016, unknown): “Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) studied the determinants of the percentage of bankers on the board by including a lagged banker percentage.”