Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures

By Andrés Almazán, Javier Suárez. 2003

415 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/651bba3a08e4be18fe888b22de16a4cdf72f2672

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Citations in the corpus

Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management (2009, positive): “Substituting (2) into (3) yields β[v2 + bm2][bm2(1 − e∗)] − c0(e∗) = 0.”
Information Control, Career Concerns and Corporate Governance (2006, neutral): “Also related to our work is Almazan and Suarez (2003), which finds that CEO entrenchment and severance pay are substitutes for incentive compensation in motivating the CEO to expend effort and not block efficient replacement of the CEO.”
A Theory of Friendly Boards (2007, background): “Unlike these papers Almazan and Suarez (2002) argue that passive (or weak) boards may be optimal under certain conditions.”
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth (2005, neutral): “Indeed, Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that a degree of entrenchment might be part of an optimal compensation contract for top managers.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “In Almazan and Suarez (2003), severance pay induces the CEO to leave voluntarily when a more able replacement is available; in Inderst and Mueller (2010), it deters the CEO from entrenching himself by concealing negative information that would lead to his dismissal. For example, severance pay (in th”
What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings. (2013, neutral): “An alternative, “supervisory” approach, adopted by models such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Almazan and Suarez (2003), and Raheja (2005), starts from the assumption that the main function of boards is to monitor and assess the CEO, rather than to intervene in particular issues.”
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management (2010, background): “11 Almazan and Suarez (2003) analyze the allocation of control over a particular decision, namely CEO replacement.”
Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders? (2005, background): “This also suggests that governance provisions could mitigate the agency cost of debt (Almazan and Suarez (2003)).4 Third, antitakeover governance provisions may have an impact on managerial actions and decision making, which in turn can affect the firm’s security holders. The corporate governance li”
Currency hedging and corporate governance: A cross-country analysis (2006, neutral): “For example, a manager's stock holdings and compensation in the firm and his human capital linked to the firm can incentivize him to avoid investing in long-term risky positive NPV projects (e.g., Almazan and Suarez, 2003).”
Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Board Structures and Charter Provisions (2011, background): “For example, Anderson et al. (2005) show that the information content of the firm’s earnings are associated with the characteristics of the firm’s audit committee.”