Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Board Structures and Charter Provisions
By Stuart L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell, Laura T. Starks. 2011
131 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/37400a8df42ca7bfee020c9d87ef31b938221237
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Citations in the corpus
- Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions (2015, unknown): “I follow Gillan et al. (2006) and Masulis et al. (2007) and substitute individual market to book ratios by the industry median (using all companies in Compustat).”
- Information Asymmetry and Corporate Governance (2015, unknown): “Similarly, Williamson (1983) and Gillan et al. (2011) argue that board monitoring and the market for corporate control can serve as substitutes for one another with regard to alternative governance mechanisms.”
- Endogenously Structured Boards of Directors in Banks (2010, background): “Consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) ‘negotiation’ theory, as explained in Section 3.”