Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?

By Mark S. Klock, Sattar A. Mansi, William F. Maxwell. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2005

603 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c8906a451b77b329ed29a370fdcd65e7f4596bf

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Citations in the corpus

The Market for Corporate Control and the Cost of Debt (2009, background): “While our coe cients on duration and convexity are consistent with those in Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), Table 3 shows that duration and convexity are highly correlated, thus the estimated coe cients may not be reliable.”
Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt (2006, positive): “other types of managerial decisions, such as spin-offs (Parrino (1997), Maxwell and Rao (2003)), share repurchases (Maxwell and Stephens (2003)), takeovers (Shastri (1990)), acquisitions (Billet, King, and Mauer (2004)), or payout policy (Dhillon and Johnson (1994)).”
The Impact of a Strong Bank-Firm Relationship on the Borrowing Firm (2011, result): “In line with the existing literature (e.g., Davis 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2006), we identify the following measures of governance: the fraction of board of directors that has multiple board…”
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns (2007, background): “…Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999), and Fahlenbrach (2004)), firm leverage (Garvey and Hanka (1999)), the cost of debt (Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2004) and Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005)) and R&D expenditures (Meulbroek et al. (1990)), in addition to firm value and long term stock performance.”
Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidence (2014, positive): “That is, weak shareholder rights mean greater managerial power (Klock et al., 2005; Chava et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2005; Jiraporn et al., 2006; Dittmar and MahrtSmith, 2007; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007).”
Control/ownership structure, creditor rights protection, and the cost of debt financing: International evidence (2010, background): “Indeed, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) show, shareholders may expropriate wealth from bondholders by undertaking risky new projects that will allow them to reap most of the gains, while bondholders bear most of the cost (Klock et al., 2005).”
Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership (2010, neutral): “Klein (1998), Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), and Brown and Caylor (2006) control for this possible reverse causality by including the lagged dependent variable in the regression model.”