Management Control for Market Transactions: The Relation Between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design, and Subsequent Performance

By Shannon W. Anderson, Henri C. Dekker. Management Sciences, 2005

384 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/64548495d4b3784d3f069579cc8513abf807102d

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In Economics and Econometrics

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Citations in the corpus

Co-ownership of intellectual property: Exploring the value-appropriation and value-creation implications of co-patenting with different partners (2014, background): “Several scholars (e.g. Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Sampson, 2004), for instance, show that misalignment between transactional characteristics and contract complexity may substantially hamper partners’ ability to generate value within alliances.”
An Empirical Analysis of the Levers of Control Framework (2007, neutral): “Thus, this study provides empirical evidence on the relations among the control systems in the LOC framework and contributes to a small but growing body of work that investigates relations among control systems (e.g., Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Kennedy & Widener, 2006).”
The path of innovation: purchasing and supplier involvement into new product development (2015, positive): “As suppliers are increasing their importance for manufacturers due to the increasing incidence of purchases (Roberts 2001), purchasing capabilities become crucial (Gadde & Håkansson, 1994; Macbeth, 1994), especially in the context of NPD collaborations (Anderson & Dekker, 2005).”
Services Supply Management: The Next Frontier for Improved Organizational Performance (2007, background): “For example, when the costs of contracting for contingencies associated with transaction uncertainty are high versus the perceived loss potential, the buyers may choose to face the potential consequences of problems after the fact.(40) In other situations, it may be prudent to reduce risk through ac”
Contracts, Extracontractual Incentives, and Ex Post Behavior in Franchise Channel Relationships (2012, background): “Furthermore, the franchisee’s range of freedom in the exchange is restricted when contractual completeness is high (Anderson and Dekker 2005).”